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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1053 
_____________ 
 
ROBERT DESROSIERS, 
                                            Appellant 
v. 
 
ROY L. HENDRICKS, Warden, Essex County Correctional Facility;  
SECRETARY US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;  
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,  
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR 
DETENTION AND REMOVAL FOR NEW JERSEY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, 
(No. 2:11-CV-04643) 
District Judge:  Honorable Faith S. Hochberg 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 6, 2013 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 24, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Robert Desrosiers petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 
contesting his detention by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
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(“ICE”). The District Court denied Desrosiers‟ petition, holding that he was subject to 
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Desrosiers appeals, arguing that 
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is not applicable because he received a noncustodial 
sentence, was not detained when released, and received a stay of removal. We will affirm 
the District Court‟s denial of Desrosiers‟ petition.  
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the facts only to the extent 
necessary for our resolution of the issues raised on appeal. 
Appellant Robert Desrosiers is a native and citizen of Haiti who became a 
permanent resident of the United States in 1992. In October 2006, Desrosiers was 
arrested on charges of assisting in the preparation of false tax returns and was released on 
bond. He subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to three years probation on June 11, 
2009. Just over two years later, Desrosiers was arrested and taken into custody by ICE, 
and charged with removability for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. On 
August 8, 2011, an Immigration Judge held that Desrosiers was subject to detention 
under the immigration law‟s mandatory detention provision. Desrosiers was later found 
to be removable, and in June 2012, we granted Desrosiers‟ request for a stay of removal 
pending review of the removal proceedings.  
Meanwhile, on August 11, 2011, Desrosiers filed this petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, arguing that the mandatory detention provision of the immigration law did not 
apply to him. He contends that the immigration statute‟s provision addressing mandatory 
detention requires that ICE detain an alien at the precise moment of his or her release. 
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Because Desrosiers was released on bond after his arrest and later sentenced to probation, 
Desrosiers contends that he was not eligible for mandatory detention. The District Court 
denied the petition, finding the statute was ambiguous and deferring to the Board of 
Immigration Appeal‟s (“BIA”) interpretation that mandatory detention does not require 
immediacy. App. 4-6 (citing In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117 (B.I.A. 2001)). Desrosiers 
timely appealed.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal from the District Court‟s denial of the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over the denial of habeas corpus relief. Vega v. United 
States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Section 1226(a) provides the Attorney General with the discretionary authority to 
detain an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United 
States.” Such individuals are eligible for a bond hearing. Under § 1226(c), however, other 
individuals are subject to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without the 
opportunity for a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (“The Attorney General shall take 
into custody any alien who [has committed enumerated offenses, including an aggravated 
felony] when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on 
parole, supervised release, or probation . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
Desrosiers argues that he is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) 
because ICE did not immediately detain him until over two years after he was released on 
probation in 2009. For that reason, he contends, § 1226(a) governs his custody and he is 
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eligible for a bond hearing to evaluate whether detention is necessary. 
We have recently addressed this precise issue in Sylvain v. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 
150 (3d Cir. 2013). There, the petitioner was detained by ICE, without a bond hearing, 
four years after he pled guilty and was conditionally discharged without any term of 
imprisonment or probation. We held that immigration officials do not lose their authority 
to impose mandatory detention under § 1226(c) if the government fails to immediately 
detain the alien upon his or her release from state or federal custody. Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 
152. In Sylvain, contrary to the District Court in this action, we indicated that we did not 
need to determine whether the law was ambiguous or whether to defer to the BIA‟s 
interpretation in Rojas. Id. at 156-57. In so concluding, we stated: 
Our holding rests on a simple observation: even if the statute calls for 
detention “when the alien is released,” and even if “when” implies some 
period of less than four years, nothing in the statute suggests that officials 
lose authority if they delay. . . . [A]s the Supreme Court has explained in a 
related context, “[t]he end of exacting compliance with the letter of [the 
statute] cannot justify the means of exposing the public to an increased 
likelihood of violent crime by persons on bail, an evil the statute aims to 
prevent.” 
 
Id. at 160 (quoting United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 720 (1990)). Our 
holding in Sylvain effectively disposes of Desrosiers‟ claim for habeas corpus relief based 
on the timing of his apprehension by ICE. 
In an attempt to pull this case from the grasp of Sylvain, Desrosiers claims that 
under Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 678 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2012), the authority to detain him 
reverts from § 1226(c) to § 1226(a) following a grant of a stay of removal. However, 
Desrosiers‟ reliance on Leslie is unavailing. In Leslie, we held that the petitioner 
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remained subject to detention under § 1226
1
 during a stay of removal. 678 F.3d at 270. 
After being continuously detained for nearly four years, we found his detention to be 
“unreasonably long” and granted a bond hearing to provide Leslie with an 
“individualized inquiry into whether detention [was] still necessary to fulfill the statute‟s 
purposes.” Id. at 270-71 (quoting Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 
2011)). We never stated in Leslie that our grant of a bond hearing turned on our earlier 
grant of a stay of removal. If we meant to suggest, as Desrosiers claims, that detention 
reverts to § 1226(a) after a stay of removal has been granted, our analysis under Diop‟s 
reasonableness of detention standard would have been unnecessary. Desrosiers‟ attempt 
to read such an outcome into Leslie is without merit. 
Finally, Desrosiers claims he is not subject to mandatory detention because he was 
sentenced to probation and not to a term of imprisonment and thus was never “released” 
from custody. Section 1226(c) directs that an individual be taken into custody “when . . . 
released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or 
probation . . . .” This language clearly contemplates convictions resulting in probationary 
sentences. In Sylvain, we recognized the BIA‟s interpretation in earlier cases that release 
following arrest can satisfy the release requirement, noting that Sylvain‟s release from 
arrest and conviction “certainly fulfilled the release requirement.” 714 F.3d at 160; see 
also In re West, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1405, 1410 (B.I.A. 2000) (reasoning that “„[r]eleased‟ in 
this context can also refer to release from physical custody following arrest” when the 
                                                        
1 While we did not specify which subsection Leslie was originally detained under, 
presumably he was subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) due to his previous 
conviction for an aggravated felony. See Leslie, 678 F.3d at 267. 
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respondent was arrested and released on bond). Furthermore, the imposition of 
Desrosiers‟ probationary sentence and termination of bond also constituted a “release” 
from custody. See Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (noting that the 
petitioner, who was released on his own recognizance, was “in custody” for the purpose 
of habeas review because he was obligated to appear whenever ordered by the court and 
could not “come and go as he please[d]”). Because Desrosiers‟ freedom of movement 
was restricted and he was obligated to appear, he remained “in custody” until sentenced 
and released on probation. Because release from his pre-conviction arrest and release 
from bond into probation both fulfill the §1226(c) release requirement, we hold that 
Desrosiers is subject to the mandatory detention provision. 
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Desrosiers is subject to mandatory 
detention. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court denying 
Desrosiers‟ petition. 
